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LrnoR LAw-LEGALITY OF A TEMPORARY LocKOUT AS A CouNTERMEASURE

STRIKE-After several months of unsuccessful negotiations on a new contract, a local union of truck drivers, affiliated with the A.F.L. Teamsters International Union, struck one of the members of a multi-employer bargaining
association. The following day the remaining members of the association locked
out their non-striking employees after advising the union that the action was
the result of the union's strike against one member of the association, and that
the employees who had been laid off would be recalled if the union withdrew
its picket line and ended the strike. The union processed a complaint to the
National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the members of the association
who had locked out their employees had coerced and discriminated against their
employees in violation of §§8(a)(l) and (3) of the amended National Labor
Relations Act.1 Held, with Member Murdock dissenting, an economic strike
TO A

1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142 (1947) §S(a) and (c), 29
U.S.C. (1952) §§l58(a) and (c).
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against one member of a multi-employer association constitutes a threat of strike
action against the remaining members which is per se the type of economic or
operative problem at the plants of the non-struck employers which justifies their
resort to a temporary lockout of employees. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109
N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1954).
Since the enactment of the original Wagner Act the NLRB has consistently
held that the NLRA leaves intact the employer's right to discontinue his operations for any reason whatsoever, provided only that the action is not motivated
by a desire to interfere with his employees' union activity.2 Furthermore, the
Board for some time has taken the position that an employer may justify a discontinuance of operations when a strike, or threat of strike, causes the danger
of spoilage of materials,3 a breach of contract with customers,4 or other operative
difficulties. 5 On the other hand, reprisals against employees for their strike activity have been uniformly held unlawful by the Board even when such activity
subjects an employer to unusual economic hardships.6 Thus, until the principal
case, the Board had steadfastly refused to allow an employer lockout prompted
by bargaining, as opposed to strictly economic considerations. Consequently,
the holding in the principal case appears on the face of things to be a capitulation by the Board to the views of the Seventh7 and Ninth8 Circuits that a lockout, when used as a defensive weapon, is the employer's correlative power to
the union's power to strike, and is not a violation of the NLRA.9 The Board,
however, seems reluctant to accept fully the correlative power theory, expressly
limiting the decision in the principal case to instances of union strike action
against one member of a multi-employer bargaining association. At first glance
this decision seems fair. Allowing the use of lockouts in the multi-employer
situation would tend to prevent the whipsawing of individual members of an
2 NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 543; NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937).
s Duluth Bottling Assn., 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
4 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
5 International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951), where union ~truck one out of
three integrated departments in the same plant; Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940), to
avoid a sitdown strike; Beckerman Shoe Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 820 (1940), to avoid excessive
wildcat strikes; Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941), to avoid a burdensome union contract; NLRB v. Lovvorn, (5th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 293 (1949).
a NLRB v. National Broadcasting Co., (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 895; NLRB v.
Star Publishing Co., (9th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 465. That merely threatening a lockout
is enough, see NLRB v. Frank Bros., (1st Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 989. If any proscribed
motive could be found, other facts will not mitigate the violation, NLRB v. Gluek Brewing
Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 847.
7 Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 576.
s Leonard v. NLRB, (9th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 435.
9 In Leonard v. NLRB, note 8 supra, the court maintained that the prohibition and
regulation of "strikes and lockouts" in the LMRA [tit. I, §8(d)(4); tit. II, §§203(c), 206,
208(a)] implies that some lockouts are lawful. The opponents of this view contend that
these sections are concerned with the existence of lockouts, not their status.
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employer association by a union,10 would act as a deterrent to strikes by large
unions against individual members of an association, 11 and would be in keeping
with the existence of the multi-employer unit. 12 In addition, the allowance of
such lockouts would be consistent with congressional intent to limit the bargaining advantages which labor was thought to have had under the original Wagner
Act. On the other hand these arguments ignore several practical considerations. 13
The genesis of employer organization is in large part a defensive response by
the small employer to the problem of dealing with large and powerful unions.14
Giving the employer association the weapon of the defensive lockout may deter
unions in the future from entering into such bargaining relationships,15 and
may be an impetus to the discontinuance of such relationship now existing,16
for a union, whose strike action against the employer bargaining individually
would be protected against lockouts, will not be inclined to look favorably on
multi-employer bargaining in which the same strike against the same employer,
now bargaining as a member of an association, would not be protected against
lockouts. Furthermore, since the burden of proof of employer anti-union motive
is on the general counsel, 17 and since such former evidence of anti-union motive
as the timing of the lockout,18 past lay-off practices by the employer,19 or antiunion statements20 are clearly irrelevant or inadmissible, the difficulties of proof
of anti-union motivation for the lockout are so great as to furnish an employer
association with an effective "union busting" weapon. 21 Particularly is this true

10 3 STAN. L. REv. 510 (1951). Query whether such whipsawing could not be offset
by establishment of a fund for the purpose of aiding employer members of the association
who are struck by the union.
11 65 HAnv. L. REv. 353 (1951).
12 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 299 (1953).
13 Most authors have assumed that the protection of multi-employer bargaining is an
end in itself. See Petro, "The NLRB on Lockouts," 3 LAB. L.J. 659 (1952). But in many
instances the "picking-off" of single members of employer associations serves an excellent
purpose, since it may be the recalcitrant, anti-union employer member who has brought
about the impasse in bargaining and who is chosen for the union attack.
HFRBmIN, THE TAFT-HARTLEY Acrr AND MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING 4 (1948).
1 5 Since a history of multi-employer bargaining is almost always essential to the
recognition of a multi-employer bargaining unit by the Board, there is no compulsion on a
union to enter such a bargaining relationship in the original instance. NLRB, ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1946).
16 Fairness requires that a union be allowed to discontinue multi-employer bargaining
at will, since the employer may do so, and since the act makes the appropriate unit a representation rather than a bargaining question. However, the Board has refused to pass
directly on the question of union withdrawal power. See Continental Baking Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 777 (1952).
11 Abe A. Bochner, 85 N.L.R.B. 633 (1949).
18 NLRB v. Somerset Classics, Inc., (2d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 613.
19 American Radiator Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1938).
20 Section 8(c) makes employer anti-union statements non-admissible as evidence of
unfair labor practices.
_
21 In practice the distinction between bargaining motivation and anti-union motivation
is too tenuous to exist in many situations. In many instances, continued economic success
at the bargaining table is a condition of the union's existence, and sometimes it is the
employer association which is the stronger of the two.
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if the language of the principal case to the effect that a strike against one member of the association per se justifies a lockout by the other members means that
the union is precluded from introducing any evidence of anti-union motivation
for the lockout.22 Finally, it is difficult to believe that a Congress which so
extensively modified and spelled out the rights of both management and labor
by the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act would not have specifically excluded defensive lockouts in the multi-employer situation from the broad
coverage of §§8(a)(l) and (3) of title I if it had intended them to be so
excluded.
John F. Dodge, Jr., S.Ed.

2 2 See

the dissenting opinion of Member Murdock in the principal case.

